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1 INTRODUCTION 
Messrs Roberts, Whitebooi, Casling and Visagie are four elderly gentlemen 
who live in poverty in Gelvandale, Port Elizabeth. At the end of 2005 they 
wished [0 apply for social assistance from the State. At the time of their 
applications, the men were over the age of 60, but none of them had 
attained the age of 65. Had they been female, they would have qualified 
for social assistance in the form of old age pensions at the age of 60.' 
These pensions would not have made them rich, but would have enabled 
them to sustain themselves.' 
The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 3 provides for a non-contributory 
social assistance system for children, the disabled and the elderly. In 
order to qualify for what is colloquially known as a state old age pension, 
the applicant has to meet certain requirements.' Only South African 
citizens or members of a group or category of persons prescribed by the 
Minister of Social Development by notice in the Government Gazette, who 
are resident in South Africa and unable to maintain themselves, may 
apply. The person should neither be a recipient of another grant nor be 
cared for in a state institution. Finally, the scheme provides that females 
are eligible for old age pensions at the age of 60, while males become 
eligible at the age of 65. This differentiation between males and females is 
the root of the predicament of the men referred [0 above. Messrs Roberts, 
• Based on a paper delivered at the Third Annual Law Conference of the Universities of 
the Western and Eastern Cape, hosted by NMMU 30-31 January 2006. 
I Matyu J 'Men challenge ruling which allows women earlier pension' The Herald (II 
November 2005) available at hnp:llwww.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/09/16/news/ 
n04_16092005.htm. accessed on 3 March 2006. The applicants had made enquiries re-
garding application for old age pensions with the Department of Welfare. bur were in-
Formed that they did not qualify for the pension in the light of the age requirement as 
set out in the Act (telephone conversation between author and Mr Mike Burmeister, at-
torney for the applicants 4 May 2006). 
2 The amount has recently been raised From R 780 to R 820 per momh (See Government 
Gazette GN 294 in GG 28672 of 31 March 2006). 
3 Date of commencement I April 2006 (Proc. R 15 in GG 28652 of 31 March 2006). 
4 S 10 of Act 13 of 2004. read with S 5 and regulation 2 of the Regulations in terms of the 










































DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELDERLY 
Whitebooi, Casling and Visagie allege that this differentiation amounts to 
unfair discrimination on the basis of sex and/or age.' They do not chal-
lenge the contents of the social assistance scheme, but merely contest the 
restrictions placed on their access to the scheme. My goal with this article 
is to determine whether these restrictions are justifiable. 
2 THE CONTEXT 
2.1 Legislative history" 
Old age pensions for whites and coloureds were first introduced in South 
Africa in 1928 by means of a non-contributory needs-based scheme 
created in the Old Age Pensions Act 22 of 1928. The passing of the Act in 
1928 was preceded by a report commissioned by the Department of 
Finance in 1926.
7 
The Commission on Old Age Pensions and Insurances compiled a report 
that contained a thorough comparative analysis of pension schemes from 
different countries around the world. In respect of pensionable age the 
Commission considered the ages provided for in legislation of some 
twenty countries." The Commission indicated that only two countries, 
namely Australia and New Zealand, had different pensionable ages for 
men and women. to The Report refers briefly to suggestions by witnesses 
who testified before the Commission in respect of pensionable age, but 
stated that no reason existed to recommend a pensionable age that is 
different from that adopted in other countries." Accordingly, it recom-
mended that the pensionable age for both men and women should be 
fixed at 65. '2 The Commission noted that some witnesses who appeared 
before the Commission were in favour of granting the old age pension to 
women five years earlier than to men, but the Report contains no detail 
on that point. However, a minority report filed by one of the Commis-
sion members, Mr Sampson, gives some idea of what these witnesses 
might have said." Mr Sampson suggested that the pensionable age for 
women should be fixed at 60 and that of males at 65. His argument for 
5 Telephone conversarion berween aurhor and Mr Mike Burmeisrer. atrorney for the 
applicants on 4 May 2006. An application challenging the constitutionality of the age 
differentiation was launched by the applicants in the TPD in November 2005. The re-
spondents had to file their answering affidavits by 15 May 2006. At the time of writing, 
the date for the hearing had not been finalised. 
6 In this section I provide an overview of the legislative history of social security legisla-
tion only insofar as it is relevant for my discussion regarding pensionable age. The dis-
criminatory nature of the social security system (prior to 1994), insofar as race is 
concerned, does not form part of the discussion. 
7 Commissioned in terms of GN 32 I of 23 February 1926 published on 26 February 
1926. 
8 First Report oj the Commission on Old Age Pensions and National Insurance (1927) UG 21-
27. 
9 Ibid at para 55. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid at para 53. 
12 Ibid at para 57. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY Ii DEVELOPMENT 
the diFFerentiation went as Follows: men most commonly married be-
tween the ages of 25 and 29, while 'the most favourable marriageable 
age' for women was between the ages of 20 and 24. According to Mr 
Sampson, this would lead [Q a man attaining pensionable age 5 years 
earlier than his wife, which would force the couple to live on a single 
pension which was inadequate to meet their financial needs. Mr Sampson 
bolstered his argument with reference [Q the greater need on the part of 
women for financial supporr from the government because industry 
regarded women as less employable at an earlier age. 14 Mr Sampson's 
plea remained a lone voice and when Parliament passed the Act on 5 June 
1928, section I provided for 65 as the pensionable age for both men and 
women. 
During the early I 930s, the economic hardship caused by the Great 
Depression forced the government [Q tighten its financial belt. During 
1931 Parliament passed legislation amending the Old Age Pensions Act of 
1928 so as to give greater discretion to the Commissioner of Pensions in 
respect of the determination of the amount to which a pensioner was 
entitled. IS For the first time, financial contributions by children and a 
spouse of the pensioner had to be taken into consideration in the deter-
mination of the pension amount. 16 Question-time in both houses of Par-
liament from 1932 to 1936 often focused on the hardship older people 
suffered because of the 1931 pension restrictions. 
By 1937 the Depression was something of the past and the South Afri-
can economy had recovered to the extent that the Minister of Finance 
announced a surplus on the budget of £5 000 000 for the 1936-1937 
financial year. '7 As a result of the surplus, the Minister of Finance an-
nounced in his budget speech of 1937 that Cabinet intended to increase 
the pension amount and means limit set for old pensions paid to 
whites.'s The Minister Furthermore proposed the reduction of the pension-
able age of women [Q 60 which would expand the provision of social 
benefits with immediate effecL'" When the proposed amendments to the 
Old Age Pensions Act came before the houses of Parliament'O in 1937, not 
one objection was raised to the lowering of the pensionable age for 
women. In fact, the issue was not even debated. 
The economic prosperity that followed the Great Depression of the early 
1930s initiated a differentiation between men and women in respect of 
pensionable age. The differentiation was carried through in subsequent 
legislation without motivation being provided, at any stage, for its existence 
and perpetuation. The Old Age Pension Act 38 of 1962 repealed the 1928 
14 Ibid. 
15 Old Age Pensions (Amendment) Act. 1931 S 2 and s 4. 
16 Ibid 15 s 6. 
17 Assembly Debates (1937) 15 March 1937 at 3227. 
18 Ibid at 3245. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The proposal [0 reduce the pensionable age for women 10 60 served before the House 
of Assembly on 5 May 1937 and before Senate on 7 May 1937. See Assembly Debates at 










































DISCRIMINA nON IN ACCESS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELDERLY 
legislation but retained the differentiation between men and women in 
respect of pensionable ages. When the Old Persons Act 81 of 1967 and 
the Social Pensions Act 37 of 1973, which repealed the 1967 legislation, 
were passed, the differentiation remained. The Social Assistance Act 59 of 
1992 which repealed the Social Pensions Act of 1973 perpetuated the 
differentiation through its regulations 21 The distinction is so deeply em-
bedded in practice that it was included in the Social Assistance Act of 
2004 without serious consideration" 
2.2 The socio-economic context 
Millions of South Africans, most of them black South Africans,!J live in 
poverty. Those who face the worst socio-economic challenges are 
women in the rural areas. '4 
According (0 the 200 I census, 7,3 % of the total South African popula-
tion of 44,8 million people are over the age of 60. Women make up 61 % 
of that figure. The 200 I report of the Ministerial Committee on Abuse, 
Neglect and Ill-treatment of Older Persons estimated that 80 % of elderly 
persons had no source of income other than the social assistance grant.LS 
These old age pensions playa vital role in sustaining many older South 
Africans and often extend (0 the support of unemployed children and 
grandchildren. 
In 2000, Cabinet requested a committee (which subsequently became 
known as the Taylor Committee) (0 launch an inquiry into a comprehensive 
system of social security for South Africa. The report of the Taylor Com-
mittee, entitled 'Transforming the Present Protecting the Future', was 
published in 2002. It paints a bleak picture of the socio-economic reality 
and challenges facing this country.26 The Report explained that the demands 
on our social security system were, and still are, severe in the face of 
21 Regularion 2 of the Regulations in terms of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (GN 
RI62 in GG 27316 of 22 February 2005). 
22 S I 0 of Act 13 of 2004. Prior [0 rhe enactment of the Bill, numerous different statutes 
provided for different forms of social The aim of the 2004 legislation was to 
consolidate existing provisions regarding security. The White Paper for Social Wel-
fare (Notice 1 108 of 1997) which provided the policy framework for the 2004 legisla-
tion, stipulated that equity and non-discrimination were basic principles in all matters of 
social security policy formulation (chapter 2, paras 9, I 0 and 28), The legislation, how-
ever, eradicated racial discrimination only. Despite the observarion by the Taylor Com-
mittee that constitutional requirements and financial constraints might require an 
increase in [he retirement age of women to bring it in Ilne with that of men, the 2004 
legislation retained the status quo: V Taylor cr al Transforming the Present Protecting 
the Future (2002) at 98. 
23 Ibid at 28·29. The number of South Africans living in poverty depends on the poverty 
line used and, accordingly. one could say that between 20 and 28 million people are liv-
ing in poverty. 
24 Statistics South AFrica Rural Survey (1999) 15. See also White Paper for Social Welfare 
chapter 1. 
25 Mothers and fathers of the nation: The forgotten people (200 I) Report of the Ministerial 
Committee on abuse, neglect and ill-treatment of older persons accessed available at 
http://www.polity.org.zalhtml/govdocslreportslwelfareI200 Ilmain_repon.huni. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVEl.OPMENT 
poverty and inequality. The bulk of the budget of the Department of Social 
Development is spent on social grants for children, the disabled and 
elderly people in need. In respect of state old pensions, the cost and 
number of people entitled to these pensions are expected to increase 
dramatically over the next 15 years. In future, the demands on our social 
security system will increase and not only because our population is 
growing older. The impact of HIV/AIDS will become more visible as time 
goes on and the social security system will have to be responsive to the 
changes necessitated by this pandemic, This will have a direct impact on 
the elderly and on children, as the economically active part of the popula-
tion will shrink, resulting in greater vulnerability and poverty on the part 
of those who are dependent on the economically active population.'" 
2.3 The constitutional context 
Two fundamental rights are directly relevant to the constitutional chal-
lenge made by Mr Roberts and his co-applicants, These are the right to 
equality as provided for in section 9 of the Constitution'o and the right of 
access to social security as provided for in section 27( I )(c) of the Constitu-
tion, On the one hand we have a civil and political right (a so-called first 
generation human right) and, on the other, a socio-economic right (a so-
called second generation human right). This classification of these rights, 
as well as their different natures, must not be used to create a hierarchy of 
rights or to juxtapose them. The Bill of Rights protects a network of rights. 
Yacoob J in the Grootboom" judgment makes it clear: 
Our Constitution entrenches both civil and political rights and social and eco-
nomic rights, All the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually 
supporting. There can be no doubt that human dignity. freedom and equality. 
the foundational values of our society. are denied those who have no food. 
clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore en-
ables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in chap 2, The realisation of 
these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and the 
evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve 
their full potential. 
The two rights are thus to be interpreted conjunctively and not disjunc-
tively. In order to do so. a brief consideration of the approach of the Con-
stitutional Court to each of these rights will be instructive, 
27 See (fn 22 above) at 98. 
28 See (fn 22 above) at 18, 
29 Ibid, 
30 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Hereinafter referred [0 as 'the 
Constitution' , 
31 Government of the Republic oJ South AJrica und others v Grootboom und others 200 I (I) SA 
46 (CC): 2001 (II) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 23. 
32 The approach of Mokgoro J in Khosa and others v The Minister of Social Development und 
others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC); 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) regarding intersecting rights 
at paras 38-39. 79 is instructive. Khosa's case turned upon the rights of permanent 
residents in relation to social security. The ground for discrimination at stake in that 
case is decidedly different from the one relevant to the current discussion, Despite the 










































DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE fOR THE ELDERLY 
2.3.1 Equality and the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
Equality is protected in the Constitution as a right and as a value. In the 
context of the current constitutional challenge, it provides the applicants 
with an enforceable right and with a value framework for the interpret-
ation of all human rights. After the expression of tentative ideas about 
equality as protected in the interim Constitution in Makwanyane, J3 the 
jurisprudence developed graduallyl4 until its culmination in the formu-
lation of the so-called' Harksen test'. 35 The Harksen analysis (or test) rests 
on the assumption that all human beings have equal dignity, that they 
have the same inherent moral worth, and that this is protected in our Con-
stitution
36 
A legislative provision that impairs the fundamental dignity of 
diFFerences, the similarities of the constirutional challenges involving alleged discrimina-
tion and social security legislation require a careful consideration of the ratio of the 
Khosa case. See Govindjee A and Ris!Ow L 'Permanem residents and eligibility For social 
security grants: Khosa v Minister of Social Development: Mahlaule v Minister of Social De-
velopment 20046 SA 505 (CC); 20046 BCLR 569 (CC)' (2005) I Speculum/uris 107. See 
discussion at 2.3.3 below. 
33 In Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC) a number of the judges 
nO[ed that the death penalty impacted negatively on the right to equality; e.g. Chaskal-
son P (as he then was) at paras 43-46; Ackermann J at paras 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 
161, 163 and 166; Oidcott J at para 185; Kemridge AJ at para 196 and Mahomed J at 
paras 262,273 and 274. 
34 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC); 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (T); Prinsloo v Van der 
Linde and another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 795 (CC). 
35 Harksen v Lane NO and others 1998 (I) SA 300 (CC); 1997 (I I) BCLR 1489 (CC) at para 
54 sets out the test: 
'(a) Does tIle provision diFFerentiate between people or categories of people? IF so, does 
the diFFerentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose7 
IF it does nO[ then there is a violation of s 8( I). Even iF it does bear a rational con-
nection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the diFFerentiation amount to unFair discrimination? This requires a two-stage 
analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the diFferentiation amount !O 'discrimination"? IF it is one a 
speciFied ground, then discrimination will have been established. IF it is nO[ on 
a specified ground, then whether or nO[ there is discrimination will depend 
upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributed and characteris-
tics which have the potential !O impair the Fundamental human dignity or !O 
aFFect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
(ii) IF the discrimination amounts to 'discrimination', does it amount to 'unFair 
discrimination"1 IF it has been Found !O have been on a speciFied ground, then 
unFairness will be presumed. IF on an unspeCiFied ground, unFairness will have 
to be established by the complainant. The test of unFairness Focuses primarily 
on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and other in his or 
her siruation. 
(c) IF the discrimination is Found to be unFair then a determination will have to be 
made as to whether the provision can be justiFied under the limitations clause (s33 
of the interim Constitution)' 
36 The Formulation of the Harksen test was preceded by President of the Republic oJ South 
Africa v Hugo and Others 1997 (4) SA I (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR (CC) in which Goldstone J 
set the table For the central role that dignity came to play in our equality jurisprudence: 
'At the heart of the prohibition of unFair discrimination lies a recognition that the pur-
pose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in 
which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect, regardless of their 










































LAW, DEMOCMCY &: DEVELOPMENT 
complainants will not pass constitutional muster. The Harksen analysis is 
useful, but it is not always necessary to engage in the rationality analysis 
as prescribed by its first enquiry.37 I n instances where a specified ground 
can clearly be identiFied as the ground For the diFferentiation, the pre-
sumption of unfairness created in section 9(5) will arise and is it up to the 
respondent to show that the discrimination is fair. 
2.3.2 The right oj access to social security 
Our courts recognise that the socio-economic rights protected in the Bill of 
Rights are justiciable. 38 However, these rights are subject to internal limita-
tion and pOSSibly to the general limitations clause contained in section 
36,39 In respect of all socio-economic rights, the text of the Constitution 
provides that the rights pertain to: (a) access to a socio-economic service 
or commodity for 'everyone,40 or a specified group, like children;" (b) that 
the rights are to be realised progressively within (c) reasonable legislative 
and policy frameworks and programmes that are (d) attuned to budgetary 
constraints:' 
Socio-economic rights impose both negative and positive obligations 
upon the state. The negative obligations require the state (or third parties) 
not to interfere with access to existing socio-economic rights," whilst the 
positive obligations require progressive realisation of the rights within a 
reasonable framework. In view of the compleXity of these rights, matters 
involving socio-economic rights must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis 
taking into consideration the textual, historical and social context of the 
particular case." The locus classicus on socio-economic rights in South 
Africa is the case of Grootboom,45 which placed emphasis on the reason-
ableness standard in relation to the positive obligations imposed by socio-
economic rights. 46 The plan (legislative and otherwise) for progressive 
37 Nalional Coalition for C'{)I and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Others 1999 (I) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para 18. 
38 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) 
para 78. 
39 Our courts have not provided clarity on the relationsliip between socio-economic riglits 
and s 36. See 2.3.3 below. 
40 S 26, S 27and s 29 of the Constitution. 
41 S 28 of the Constitution. 
42 In Xhosa at para 64 Mokgoro J acknowledges rhe important effec[ of bUdgetary con-
straints on social welfare programmes. It stands to reason that it cannot be expecred of 
the state to provide social assistance which it cannot afford. See in this regard Jansen 
van Rensburg L 'The Xhosa case - opening the door for the inclusion of all children in 
the child support grant'!' (2005) 20 SAPL 102 at I 19-120 
43 Crootboom at para 34. 
44 Crootboom at paras 21-22. 
45 Grootboom at paras 39-44. This approach was subsequently connrrned in Mimster of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 
33-34 and in Xhosa ar paras 43-45, 48-49. 
46 For a discussion of the reasonableness standard set by tlie Constitutional Court see 0 
Brand 'Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution' in 0 










































DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELDERLY 
realisation of the right must be reasonable 'in ... conception and. 
implementation,4? when considered in historical, social and economic 
context. Progressive realisation. according to the Constitutional Court. 
means that 'accessibility should be progressively facilitated: legal, admin-
istrative, operational and financial hurdles should be examined and, 
where possible, lowered over time,:$ 
The Constitution does not define social security or social assistance, but 
the mere fact that both concepts are used means that they are to be 
distinguished. Olivier4'! points out that no universally accepted definition of 
the concept 'social security' exists. As used in the Constitution. social 
securi~¥ is seen as being a broader concept that includes social assis-
tance." Social security is usually understood as insurance against social 
risks. e.g. illness, maternity. employment injury. unemployment. old age 
etc. Social assistance, on the other hand. is seen as 'tax-based benefit 
payments on a universal or targeted basis. aimed at minimum income-
support'.52 Old age pensions. as provided for under the Social Assistance 
Act, will fall under social assistance. 
2.3.3 Linking sections 9 and 27(1)(c) 
What does a conjunctive interpretation of section 9 and section 27( I Hc) 
entail? How are these rights to be applied to the case at hand? Should one 
opt for the Harksen analysis while keeping the demands of s27(l )(c) in 
mind, or should the emphasis be on the reasonableness of the social 
security scheme while keeping the demands of equality in mind? 
In this regard, the approach of Mokgoro J in the majority judgment of 
the Khosa case is instructive." The right to equality and the right of access 
to social security are mutually supporting and mutually reinforcing at their 
point of intersecting." In determining the scope of these rights, a broad 
and inclusive approach is to be taken. This requires a careful considera-
tion of the scope of both rights and their combined effect within the 
context of the Bill of Rights as a whole. 
In dealing with the intersecting rights to equality and access to social 
security, Mokgoro J oPLed for a socio-economic rights analysis supported 
by an analysis in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. She points out 
47 (irootvoom at para 42. 
48 Crootvoom at para 45. 
49 Olivier MP 'The concept of SOCIal security' in Olivier MP, Smit Nand Kalula ER (eds) 
Social security. A legal analysis (2003) 24. 
50 See in this regard the broad approach to social protection favoured by the Taylor 
Commission, (fn 22 above) at 40-41 See also Jansen van Rensburg L and Lamarche L 
'The right to social security and assistance' in Brand D and Heyns C (cds) Socio-
economic righrs in Sowh Africa (2005) 209-212. 
51 Olivier (fn 49 above) at 24-25. 
52 [LO Introduction to social security (J 989) 4-5 as quoted in Olivier (fn 50 above) at 24, 
53 The minority judgment authored by Ngcobo J takes a differenr methodological approach 
which leads to the same conclusion as that of Mokgoro j's majority judgment. See Khosa 
at paras 102-104 in this regard. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
that equality is implicit in respect of access to socio-economic rights 
because of the wording of the ConstitutionS' For her, the question is 
whether the legislative and other programmes providing for social assis-
tance for older persons are reasonable within their contextual setting. 
Equality is one of the factors to be considered when determining the 
reasonableness, or otherwise, of the social assistance scheme. In order to 
be deemed reasonable, the scheme 'must not be arbitrary. or irrational 
nor must it manifest a naked preference' in differentiating between 
people or groups of people.'b 
Socio-economic rights are clearly subject to internal limitations. How-
ever, the limitation of socio-economic rights in terms of section 36 has 
been more controversial.'7 Mokgoro J does not provide any further clarity 
on this point, but states that 'section 36 can only have relevance if what is 
'reasonable' for the purposes of that section, is different to what is 'rea-
sonable' for the purposes of sections 26 and 27'.'8 She concludes that a 
pronouncement on the relationship between section 36 and the socio-
economic rights is not necessary for the purposes of the case and leaves 
the matter open
S9 
Thus, in Khosa's case, Mokgoro J considered the two 
standards of reasonableness to be identical and considered the internal 
limitation to be sufficient to meet the requirements of section 36. It seems 
highly unlikely that an unreasonable legislative provision would be saved 
by section 36. bO 
3 CONCLUSION 
UtiliSing Mokgoro J's comprehensive approach as set out in Khosa, the 
question in the present matter can be summarised as follows: Are the 
criteria upon which government chose to limit the payment of social 
assistance benefits to older people consistent with the Bill of Rights as a 
whole?61 
One needs to establish whether the social assistance scheme is reason-
able and whether access to the scheme is reasonable. This will include an 
assessment of equality of access to the scheme. The applicants contend 
that they are denied access to the social assistance scheme because they 
are male. Sex is listed as a ground in section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
Therefore the presumption of unfairness provided for in section 9(5) will 
55 Khosa at para 42. 'Everyone' is emitled [0 the socio-economic rights protected in the 
ConstitU[ion. 
56 Khosa at para 53. 
57 See Khosa at 84 and specifically note 88. 
58 Khosa at para 83. See also lies K 'Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal 
limitations clauses' (2004) 20 SAJHR 448 and Govindjee and Ristow (fn 32 above). 
59 Khosa at para 84. 
60 If a coun finds that a legislative provision regarding, for example, access [0 housing is 
unreasonable using the internal limitations set OU[ in s 26 it would be illogical for it [0 
conclude that such an unreasonable provision is acceptable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom, equality and dignity (viz. the s 36 benchmark). 










































DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELDERLY 
arise. The State has to prove that the differentiation in respect of pension-
able age does not amount to unfair discrimination. 
The justification put forward by Mr Sampson in 1928 does not seem to 
be relevant in our current contexr. However. different reasons might serve 
to justify the differentiation in 2006. In order to determine whether dis-
crimination is unfair, it is necessary to consider the impact of the dis-
crimination on the complainants. That requires a consideration of their 
position in society and determinin~ whether they have been the victims of 
unfair discrimination in the past." The fundamental question is whether 
the discrimination 'has led to an impairment of their fundamental human 
dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature' .0' In 
order for the state to justify the differentiation, it has to show that the 
fundamental dignity of the male complainants is not impaired by setting 
their pensionable age at 65 as opposed to 60 in the case of women. 
Women in South Africa, and particularly black women, have been mar-
ginalised by patriarchy and apartheid in the past. co The applicants in this 
matter are male. Men as a group did not suffer as a result of unfair dis-
crimination in the past. But the applicants are also poor and their poverty 
makes them vulnerable. in the Khosa case Mokgoro J remarked: 67 
There can be no doubt that the applicants [permanent residents] are part of a 
vulnerable group in society and, in the circumstances of the present case, are 
worthy of constitutional protection We are dealing, here, with intentional, 
statutorily sanctioned unequal treatment of part of the South African commu-
nity. This has a strong stigmatising effect. Because both permanent residents 
and citizens contribute to the welfare system through the payment of taxes, the 
lack of congruence between benefits and burdens created by a law that denies 
benefits to permanent residents almost inevitably creates the impression that 
permanent residents are in some way inferior to citizens and less worthy of 
social assistance. Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of 
poverty equally as a community represents the extent to which wealthier 
members of the community view the minimal well-being of the poor as con-
nected with their personal well-being and the well-being of the community as a 
whole. In other words, decisions about the allocation of public benefits repre-
sent the extent to which poor people are treated as equal members of SOCiety. 
The poverty of elderly men makes them an identifiable marginalised 
group in our society, placing them in a position similar to that of the 
permanent residents who were unfairly discriminated against in the case 
of Khosa. A statutory provision that differentiates between groups of 
people and disregards the vulnerability of a particular group impairs the 
fundamental dignity of that group. Accordingly, a strong argument could 
be made regarding unfair discrimination as a result of the differentiation 
in respect of pensionable age. 
62 President oJ the Republic oj Sowh Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA I (Cel at para 82 per 
O·ReganJ. 
63 Harksen at para 52. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Brink v Kitsh0.ff at para 44. 
66 The vas I majority of the recipients of state old age pensions are black and thereFore 
previously disadvantaged. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Furthermore. the intersection of sections 9 and 27 requires an assess-
ment of the reasonableness of the scheme and the regulation of access to 
the scheme. In this. the availability of resources is an important consid-
eration. It is difficult to determine exactly what the budgetary implications 
of lowering the pensionable age for men would be. It stands to reason that 
it would mean that more money would have to be set aside for old age 
pensions which could potentially result in budgetary shortfalls.
6s 
The 
reasonableness of the social assistance scheme will. furthermore. depend 
on the progressive equal realisation of the right for all similarly situated 
people entitled to such benefits. namely elderly people in need of social 
assistance. The current framework creates no space for the lowering of 
the legal hurdles facing poor elderly men. No provision is made in the 
legislation to facilitate greater accessibility to the scheme and this is in 
conflict with the requirement set out in Grootboom.
69 
Accordingly. the 
scheme fails the reasonableness test insofar as accessibility is concerned 
and should be held to be unconstitutional. 
The long term goal provided for in our Constitution is that of an equal 
society based upon non-sexism. amongst other values'"o The legal barriers 
created in the statute are remnants of a past in which men were expected 
to be providers and women were expected to be dependants. The time 
has come to look beyond the sex of applicants for old age pensions and to 
consider need as a primary factor. The four individuals who are challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the differentiation are part of a marginalised 
group of poverty stricken, mostly black, South Africans. They deserve the 
protection of the Constitution. 
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